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Abstract
Influential accounts interpret anorexia as arising from perfectionism, dichotomous thinking, and poor control expressed in a
variety of life domains, resulting in low self-esteem. In this context, restraining eating would allow patients to re-establish some
control and self-esteem. Although this view has offered important insight, one shortcoming is that constructs such as perfection-
ism, control, and dichotomous thinking, remain poorly specified. To clarify these constructs, we propose a computational model
of anorexia. This relies on previous theories of evaluation, which highlight its reference-dependent nature: when attributing a
value to an outcome, our brain automatically assesses the outcome relative to its context. Following these theories, the model
proposes that a high reference point explains general characteristics such as perfectionism, dichotomous thinking, low self-
esteem, and low sense of control. These characteristics would result specifically in anorexia when the sense of control regarding
body shape, compared with other life domains, is relatively high. The model raises the possibility that reference effects alsomight
explain why patients pursue extremely low weight; exposure to skinny body images—one product of obsessive dieting—might
change the reference point for their own body, hence leading to extremely low body weight, staunch refusal to gain weight, and
body misperceptions. The model contributes to clarify key concepts adopted in the literature and their relation. Such computa-
tional formulation might help to foster theoretical debate, formulating novel empirical predictions, and integrate psychological
and neuroscientific perspectives on anorexia.
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Introduction
Anorexia nervosa (AN) is a form of eating disorder
characterised by an obsession with body shape, combined
with extremely low weight, staunch refusal to eat, and body
misperceptions (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). In
conjunction with these symptoms, AN patients manifest char-
acteristics common to other disorders, including perfection-
ism, dichotomous thinking, low self-esteem, and scarce sense
of control (Kaye, Wierenga, Bailer, Simmons, & Bischoff-
Grethe, 2013). Influential accounts (Cooper, 2005; Fairburn,
Shafran, & Cooper, 1999; Slade, 1982) interpret AN as arising
from perfectionism, dichotomous thinking, and poor control
expressed in a variety of life domains, resulting in low self-
esteem. In this context, controlling body shape by restraining
eating would provide patients with the only way to re-
establish some degree of control and self-esteem, hence
becoming the patients’ primary goal. This view has of-
fered important insight and has been supported empiri-
cally. However, one shortcoming is that fundamental
constructs such as perfectionism, control, and dichoto-
mous thinking remain somewhat poorly specified. In
other words, what do these concepts precisely mean?
To address this, factor analysis can be adopted to iden-
tify different dimensions underlying these constructs.
This data-driven approach is well-established and has
contributed substantially to the literature (Bardone-
Cone et al., 2007; Byrne, Allen, Dove, Watt, &
Nathan, 2008) (e.g., highlighting different forms of
control, with only some affected in AN; Froreich,
Vartanian, Grisham, & Touyz, 2016). We advocate an
alternative, theory-driven, approach, consisting in de-
scribing the mechanisms underlying AN adopting com-
putational modelling (Frank et al. , 2016). This
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perspective offers a formal description of the mecha-
nisms involved, potentially providing a clearer definition
of concepts classically used in the literature and of their
relationship.
At the core of our proposal is the notion of evaluation (the
process through which positive or negative value is attributed
to the different outcomes), which underlies concepts such as
eating behaviour, perfectionism, control, and self-esteem.
Evaluation drives “hot” aspects of cognition such as emotion,
motivation, affect, and decision-making. Contemporary
models of evaluation highlight its reference-dependent nature
(Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006; Louie, Glimcher, & Webb, 2015;
Louie, Khaw, & Glimcher, 2013; Rigoli, 2019; Rigoli et al.,
2016; Stewart, 2009; Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006;
Woodford, 2012): when attributing a value to an outcome,
our brain automatically assesses the outcome not in isolation,
but relative to its context. As an example, consider an individ-
ual who is purchasing a house and who discovers that the price
of the house is £10 more than expected. Compare this with
someone paying for a coffee and realising that the price is £10
more than expected. Although objectively both individuals
experience an equivalent unforeseen extra-cost of £10, we
would expect the second person to be way more upset than
the first. This example stresses the idea that evaluation is ref-
erence-dependent, namely that the subjective value of out-
comes strongly depends on the context where these outcomes
are experienced. Our theory builds on this notion, and hence it
is referred to as Reference Dependent Model of Anorexia
(RDMA). We will see how this framework can shed light on
key constructs underlying AN. The next section introduces the
computational model. This is followed by a description of
how general characteristics (such as perfectionism and scarce
control) first, and specific symptoms next, arise. Finally, the
model is discussed in relation with previous models of AN
and regarding other broad issues.
The model
Contemporary models of reference-dependency disagree on
important issues, but they all agree on fundamental principles
(Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006; Louie et al., 2013, 2015; Rigoli,
2019; Rigoli, Friston, et al., 2016; Stewart, 2009; Stewart
et al., 2006). Here we will rely on a specific model (Rigoli,
2019, 2021; Woodford, 2012); however, similar arguments
would arise if different models were adopted. The reason for
focusing on this specific model is that, at least in some do-
mains, this represents one of the major candidates for
explaining evaluation (Rigoli, 2019). Moreover, the model is
simple and can be easily applied to AN (see below).
Consider an environment or context k (e.g., school) where a
set of outcomes (e.g., school marks) can be experienced, each
associated with a raw value (e.g., the actual mark). For each
outcome, the calculation of the subjective value VR, k associ-







A logistic function (prescribing that the subjective value of
a stimulus is 0 < VR, k < 1) has emerged as more appropriate
than alternative possibilities (e.g., a linear function; Rigoli,
Friston, et al., 2016; Rigoli, 2019) to explain empirical evi-
dence on decision-making (e.g., it can account for context-
effects in the curvature of the value function (Rigoli, 2019;
Stewart, 2009; Stewart et al., 2006)). The parametersμk and σk
(being σk > 0) are the reference point and the uncertainty
associated with context k, respectively (each context has its
own parameters). These parameters capture the reference-
dependent nature of evaluation: the subjective value, which
is experienced at a subjective level and drives behaviour, is
not equivalent to the raw value, but it depends on some refer-
ence information. The RDMA proposes that subjective value
can be experienced as either reward or punishment, occurring
when VR, k > 0.5 and VR, k < 0.5, respectively (a neutral expe-
rience occurs when VR, k = 0.5). Based on this definition, note
that reward is experienced when Rk > μk and punishment is
experienced when Rk < μk. Therefore, the reference point can
be interpreted as the standard (or an expectation) associated
with a context k, to which outcomes are compered to and are
evaluated as reward (i.e., better than the standard) or as pun-
ishment (i.e., worse than the standard) (Fig. 1). For example,
the reference point μk might indicate the standard mark at
school, implying that a better mark will be perceived as suc-
cess and a worse mark as failure. The parameter σk can be
Fig. 1 Subjective value as a function of raw value for different reference
point μk (σk = 20 for all lines)
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interpreted as the level of uncertainty about the own standard,
prescribing how much a discrepancy from the reference point
will be weighted. In other words, it determines how subjec-
tively good or bad an outcome is compared with the reference
point. For example, if one has received a mark above/below
the standard, the uncertainty parameter determines how sub-
jectively good/bad the mark is. If there is high uncertainty,
then a discrepancy will not be weighted much, minimizing
the subjective distance from the reference point. Hence, the
mark above/below the standard will not be considered too
good/bad. Conversely, if there is low uncertainty, a discrep-
ancy will be weighted heavily, maximising the subjective dis-
tance from the reference point. Hence, the mark above/below
the standard will be considered as very good/bad.
Based on equation 1, an individual can evaluate a variety of
states within a context, such as the current, past, and future
state of affair. Three of such evaluations are particularly rele-
vant: 1) Vpres, k, capturing the subjective value attributed to the
current state of affair (e.g., the current performance at school);
2) Vact, k, capturing the subjective value attributed to the future
outcome achievable by performing appropriate actions (e.g.,
the performance at school achievable with proper commit-
ment); 3) VNoact, k, capturing the subjective value attributed
to the future outcome expected without performing those ap-
propriate actions (the performance at school expected without
much commitment) (note that, by definition, Vact, k > VNoact, k).
The RDMA proposes that these three evaluations are at the
root of both self-esteem and control. Self-esteem reflects the
level of satisfaction about the current general state of the self
(Branden & Archibald, 1982). Based on this, the RDMA de-
fines self-esteem as equal to the subjective value associated
with the current state (Vpres, k) averaged across all contexts.
Control indicates to what degree one expects to achieve goals
with appropriate actions (Dayan, 2012; Maier & Seligman,
1976; Rigoli, Pezzulo, & Dolan, 2016; Seligman, 1974).
Following this definition, control for context k can be defined
as:
Ck ¼ Vact;k−VNoact;k ð2Þ
This corresponds to the subjective value expected by
performing appropriate actions minus the value expected
without those actions. While Ck describes the control associ-
ated with a specific context k, a general control can be derived
by averaging control across all contexts (Rigoli, Pezzulo, &
Dolan, 2016). The RDMA proposes that control is critical
when deciding which context one should engage with: con-
texts associated with higher control would be more likely to
attract engagement. For example, if one perceives higher con-
trol in the context of sport compared with the context of
school, the person will engage in sport and disregard school.
Intuitively, this captures the idea that people are attracted by
contexts where they believe that their condition can be
improved.
In short, thanks to the reference point μk and the uncertain-
ty parameter σk, the RDMA highlights the reference-
dependent nature of subjective value. From this model, a for-
mal definition of self-esteem and control can be proposed.
Below, we will explore how this model of evaluation can be
applied to explain AN.
General characteristics
Consider an example of a context k where an agent can expe-
rience four possible raw values (10, 30, 50, 70), and where the
contextual average and SD are 40 and 10, respectively. The
RDMA suggests that, within this context, adaptive evaluation
occurs if the reference point μk corresponds to the contextual
average (equal to 40 in this example) and the uncertainty pa-
rameter σk corresponds to the contextual standard deviation
SD (equal to 10 in this example) (Rigoli, 2019). In other
words, adaptive evaluation occurs when an individual has a
realistic representation of the context and its statistics and uses
this representation to evaluate each stimulus appropriately rel-
ative to the others. Conversely, when the reference point μk
and the uncertainty parameter σk do not reflect the true context
statistics, evaluation is considered as maladaptive by the
RDMA.
We propose that an excessively high reference point μk at
play across multiple contexts is at the root of AN. According
to the RDMA, what are the implication of an excessively high
reference point μk? Let us consider the example above (de-
scribing a context with raw values 10, 30, 50, 70), but now
where the reference point μk is equal to 70 (Fig. 2), namely
substantially higher than the contextual average (which is 40).
Fig. 2 Subjective value as a function of raw value in a context where
possible raw amounts are 10, 30, 50, and 70. Value function for different
parameter sets is plotted, for a case where parameters reflect the true
context statistics (μk = 40, σk = 10) and a case where the reference point
μk is high (μk = 70, σk = 10)
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Comparing the results for μk = 40 versus μk = 70, two key
differences emerge. First, all subjective values are lower when
μk = 70 (Fig. 2). In other words, a high reference point will
lead to considering all possible outcomes as more negative.
The second aspect concerns the distance in subjective value
among outcomes that are adjacent in the distribution (e.g., 30
minus 10, or 50 minus 30, or 70 minus 50) (Fig. 2). When the
reference point μk is equal to the contextual average (in our
example,μ = 40), this distance is maximal near the average (in
our example, it is maximal for 50 minus 30; Fig. 2).
Conversely, when the reference point μk is high (in our exam-
ple, μ = 70), this distance is maximal for a region above the
average (in our example, it is maximal for 70 minus 50).
Moreover, in the lower tail of the contextual distribution, dis-
tances among adjacent outcomes are larger when the reference
point is close to the contextual average compared to when it is
high. In our example, for 50 minus 30 and 30 minus 10, the
distance in subjective value is larger when μk = 40 compared
to when μk = 70. In short, when comparing a reference point
close to the contextual average versus a high reference point,
the distance for adjacent outcomes is larger, except for a re-
gion at the high-end of the distribution.
We argue that this scenario can explain general character-
istics of AN, including perfectionism, dichotomous thinking,
low self-esteem, and low general sense of control (Burns &
Fedewa, 2005; Byrne et al., 2008; Egan, Piek, Dyck, & Rees,
2007; Egan, Wade, & Shafran, 2011; Flett & Hewitt, 2002).
Perfectionism occurs when all possible outcomes are consid-
ered as negative except for only those at the very high-end of
the distribution (Egan et al., 2007, 2011; Flett & Hewitt,
2002). Moreover, even these outcomes at the top are usually
not experienced with positive feelings, but rather with just a
sense of relief. For example, the top mark at school might not
be perceived as a great achievement to be celebrated, but sim-
ply as the minimum to be expected. This picture of perfection-
ism fits with the scenario described by the RDMA where a
high reference point is implemented. In our example, all out-
comes are evaluated as negative (i.e., they have a subjective
value less than 0.5) except for the outcome of 70, which is
associated with a neutral value (equal to 0.5). This scenario
captures the notion that, in perfectionism, expectations (cap-
tured by the reference point μk) are too high, resulting in
disappointment (when the outcome is worse than expecta-
tions) or, at best, in relief (when the outcome matches
expectations).
Dichotomous thinking occurs when possible outcomes are
grouped in two opposing categories (Byrne et al., 2008).
Moreover, dichotomous thinking is characterised by polariza-
tion, namely it maximises the perceived distance among cate-
gories of outcomes and minimises the distance within each
category (Byrne et al., 2008). This picture of dichotomous
thinking also fits with the scenario described by the RDMA
where a high reference point is implemented. In our example,
comparing the condition where μk = 70 versus μk = 40, the
difference in subjective value is minimised for 10, 30, and 50;
in other words, these outcomes are perceived as more similar.
Hence, the RDMA predicts that a high reference point will
group these outcomes together. At the same time, comparing
the condition where μk = 70 versus μk = 40, the distance
between 50 and 70 is enhanced; these outcomes are perceived
as more far apart (Fig. 2). Therefore, in line with the notion of
dichotomous thinking, the RDMA predicts that a high refer-
ence point groups the outcomes of 10, 30, and 50 together,
while treating the outcome of 70 as a separate category (note
that dichotomous thinking is exacerbated by a low uncertainty
parameter σk, something that alsomight characterise someAN
patients).
Because a higher reference point μk implies lower subjec-
tive values (see above), low self-esteem (i.e., a low subjective
value attributed to the current state (Vpres, k) averaged across
all contexts) also ensues (Brockmeyer et al., 2013). Finally,
higher reference point usually entails low general control
(Surgenor, Horn, Plumridge, & Hudson, 2002): consider two
individuals, with one having higher reference point μk.
Imagine that both individuals predict that an outcome of 50
can be achieved with the correct behaviour and that an out-
come of 10will be achieved without that behaviour. Perceived
control will be lower for the individual having higher refer-
ence point μk, because the distance in subjective value be-
tween 50 and 10 (corresponding to the level of control; see
equation 2) is smaller for this individual.
Why would some people develop a high reference point?
Genetic factors might be important, expressed in an inbuilt
predisposition for developing higher reference points for eval-
uation. Social pressure for high standards also might be at
play. This might comprise cultural pressure (e.g., exposure
to media focusing on highly successful individuals) (Crisp,
1980; Garner & Garfinkel, 1980), group pressure (e.g.,
experiencing highly competitive schools or sport activities)
(Costa-Font & Jofre-Bonet, 2013), and family pressure (e.g.,
parents teaching their children that the top mark at school is
the norm) (Cook&Kearney, 2009, 2014).Moreover, repeated
experience of outcomes within a context will normally under-
pin new learning, leading to a progressive adaptation of the
reference point (we do not explore learning here, although this
represents an interesting research avenue). However, learning
might be impaired for some individuals, resulting in an exces-
sively small learning rate, implying that for these individuals
the reference point might fail to adapt and remain abnormally
high.
Altogether, within the RDMA, a high reference point at
play across contexts elicits perfectionism, dichotomous think-
ing, low self-esteem, and low general control. RDMA inter-
prets these as all arising from a unique factor (a high reference
point), explaining why empirically they are commonly ob-
served together (Burns & Fedewa, 2005; Egan et al., 2007;
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Kaye et al., 2013). A high reference point is proposed to be at
the root of AN and, therefore, of perfectionism, dichotomous
thinking, low self-esteem, and low control as observed in the
illness. This raises the crucial question: how do these general
features (observed also in other mental disorders) result in the
specific AN symptoms? The next section examines this question.
Specific symptoms
Perfectionism, dichotomous thinking, low self-esteem, and
low general control are characteristics of AN but also of other
disorders, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and
depression (Blatt, 1995; Egan et al., 2011; Frost & Steketee,
1997; Orth, Robins, & Roberts, 2008; Seligman, 1974). To
understand when, according to the RDMA, such general char-
acteristics result specifically in AN, remember that the RDMA
proposes that individuals tend to engage in life contexts where
they perceive higher control, and disregard the other contexts
(see above). This implies that, when an individual perceives
higher control regarding body shape compared to all other life
contexts, the individual will focus on shaping the body
(Cooper, 2005; Fairburn et al., 1999; Slade, 1982). If the dif-
ference in perceived control for body shape compared to all
other life contexts is dramatic, this will result in an obsession
for body shape (and an exclusive engagement with related
activities), which is at the core of AN. More specifically, the
RDMA suggests that AN patients have (1) high reference
point μk for all life contexts including body shape, (2) they
attribute low subjective value to the current state VR, k for all
contexts including body shape, (3) they attribute low control
(defend by equation 2) for all contexts except body shape, and
(4) they attribute relatively higher control to the body shape
context (i.e., they believe that, with the right commitment,
they can achieve a much better outcome (Vact, k) compared
with no commitment (VNoact, k)—note that here the difference
between Vact, k and VNoact, k is critical, and not the individual
value of these variables). This argument explains a core symp-
tom in AN, namely the obsession for body shape. We propose
that relatively higher control for the body shape is specific to
AN: an individual with a similar profile but with relatively
higher control for, say, hygiene instead of body shape will
not develop AN, but an obsession for hygiene (this reasoning
can inspire a future extension of the model to OCD).
However, so far this argument leaves other core symptoms
unexplained: why is an extremely low body weight, and not a
normal bodyweight, the target for patients? Andwhy do patients
perceive themselves as overweight evenwhen their actual weight
is dramatically low (Moelbert et al., 2017)? One possibility com-
patible with the RDMA is that patients have an extremely low
body weight as target already before the illness emerges. This
target might be the consequence of repeated exposure to people
and media despising body fat and eating, and praising thinness
and fasting (Crisp, 1980; Garner & Garfinkel, 1980) (genetic
factor might also be at play). However, the RDMA raises another
possibility: the patients’ target might not be fixed from the start,
but it might decrease as the illness progresses. This decrease
might depend on the principle, advocated by reference-
dependent cognition models (Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006; Louie
et al., 2013, 2015; Rigoli, 2019; Rigoli, Friston, et al., 2016;
Stewart, 2009; Stewart et al., 2006), that the reference point
changes by tracking changes in the context statistics. Applied
to AN, this principle implies the following: at first, patients might
have a relatively normal weight as target. When, as described
above, an obsession for body shape arises, patients would start
dieting to achieve this target. Through selective attention
(Blechert, Ansorge, & Tuschen-Caffier, 2010; Jansen,
Nederkoorn, & Mulkens, 2005), dieting would expose patients
to more and more images of bodies with lower weight. This
repeated exposure would lead to a shift in the reference point
μk towardsmore andmore thinness, changing the patients’ target:
now a lower body shape is necessary to achieve the same level of
subjective value as before. This explanation entails a vicious
cycle, whereby an obsessive diet leads to exposure to skinny
body images and in turn to a shift in the reference point, encour-
aging further dieting. This explains a second core symptom of
AN, namely the extremely low body weight combined with a
staunch refusal to gain weight. Bodymisperceptions, a third core
symptom (Moelbert et al., 2017), also arise from this argument:
according to the notion that perception is not absolute but refer-
ence-dependent, a change in the reference point would result in
perceiving the own body as overweight despite clear evidence of
the contrary. Given that only few people on a diet develop AN,
when would dieting lead to developing the specific symptoms of
AN? Our reasoning suggests that these symptoms emerge only
in some specific circumstances, namely (1) when the diet is
obsessive and rigid and (2) when the person dieting is
characterised by elevated perfectionism, dichotomous thinking,
low self-esteem, low general control, and relatively high control
for body shape. However, to some extent, the processes fostering
lower target body weight might be promoted by diet also in
people who do not develop any pathology.
In short, the RDMA argues that with AN, a low sense of
control pervades all life contexts except body shape, resulting
in an obsession about the latter. This would trigger a rigid diet
associated with exposure to skinny body images, leading to a
shift in reference point. Such shift would explain why patients
aim at an extremely low body weight and why they perceive
themselves as overweight despite evidence of the contrary.
Discussion
Building on influential accounts of AN, the RDMA offers a
computational perspective on this illness. Relying on the idea
of reference-dependent evaluation (Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006;
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Louie et al., 2013, 2015; Rigoli, 2019; Rigoli, Friston, et al.,
2016; Stewart, 2009; Stewart et al., 2006), the key proposal is
that a high reference point is at the root of general character-
istics, such as perfectionism, dichotomous thinking, low self-
esteem, and low sense of control. These characteristics would
result specifically in AN when the sense of control regarding
body shape, compared with other life domains, is relatively
high. The model raises the possibility that reference effects
also might explain why patients aim at an extremely low
weight: exposure to skinny body images (one of the product
of obsessive dieting) might change the reference point for the
own body; hence leading to extremely low body weigh,t
staunch refusal to gain weight, and body misperceptions.
Previous influential theories of AN have emphasised the
role of perfectionism and dichotomous thinking in decreasing
self-esteem and sense of control (Cooper, 2005; Fairburn
et al., 1999; Slade, 1982). These processes would be typical
of many girls in their adolescence, when a shift from a depen-
dent to a more independent role is expected, and when the new
standards might appear as impossible to achieve (Crisp,
1980). In this paralysing situation, self-starvation would be-
come appealing as a way to establish control and self-esteem
at least in one life domain (Cooper, 2005; Fairburn et al.,
1999; Slade, 1982). This picture described by previousmodels
is not far from the interpretation offered by the RDMA. The
latter contributes to the literature by offering a clear analysis of
the key concepts and of their dynamics. First, perfectionism,
dichotomous thinking, self-esteem, and control are all framed
within a reference-dependent evaluation perspective. A
unique factor, namely a high reference point, is proposed to
explain all these aspects. This helps understanding why these
aspects often appear together empirically (Egan et al., 2007,
2011; Flett &Hewitt, 2002). Second, the RDMAdefines these
key aspects mathematically rather than verbally (e.g., see
equation 2 for the definition of control). Although some sim-
plifications are necessary, mathematical definitions are rigor-
ous, facilitating theoretical debate and formulation of empiri-
cal hypotheses (Frank et al., 2016). For example, a novel
empirical hypothesis arising from the RDMA is that, as the
illness progresses, patients’ weight standards might change
because of reference effects. Third, the RDMA offers a mech-
anistic perspective on how, in specific circumstances (i.e.,
when the relative control associated with body shape is high),
general characteristics (common to several disorders) produce
the core symptoms of AN. A formal interpretation of these
symptoms emerges: for example, body misperceptions are
proposed to arise because of a comparison with an extremely
low reference point when making judgements about the own
body.
However, despite its similarity to previous models
(Cooper, 2005; Fairburn et al., 1999; Slade, 1982), the
RDMA is a novel theory, and some of its key tenets remain
to be tested. We have already highlighted the possibility that,
as AN progresses, patients’ weight standards might change
because of reference effects. Two key predictions arise from
this. First, weight standards are predicted to decrease as AN
progresses and symptoms worsen. Indirect evidence in sup-
port of this indicates that, after treatment, patients’ body mis-
perceptions ameliorate, and that this occurs in conjunction
with improvements in symptoms (Boehm et al., 2016;
Calugi, El Ghoch, Conti, & Dalle Grave, 2018; Roy &
Meilleur, 2010). Second, changes in standards are explained
as arising from reference effects, a prediction so far unex-
plored (e.g., this implicates that, for AN patients, repeated
exposure to body images with higher or lower weight will
affect their standards accordingly). Another key prediction
of the RDMA is that, while AN is associated with lower gen-
eral control (in line with empirical evidence; Kaye et al.,
2013), patients perceive relatively higher control for body
shape compared to other domains; this key aspect remains to
be assessed empirically. This also implicates that events that
diminish control for other life domains (e.g., perceived failure
at school or sport) will increase the focus upon body shape,
whereas events that increase control for other life domains will
shift the focus away from body shape. At the same time,
events that diminish control for body shape (e.g., perceived
failure to lose weight) are predicted to decrease the focus upon
body shape (one of the immediate consequences of this could
be binge eating), whereas events that increase control for body
weight will increase the focus upon body shape. These are all
predictions that remain to be examined empirically.
Moreover, the RDMA raises specific predictions about the
value function (mapping outcomes to subjective values)
characterising AN, distinguishing the model from other pro-
posals. For example, the idea of a high reference point (advo-
cated by the RDMA) implies that most outcomes will elicit
similar subjective value, but that the very top outcome will
prompt a substantial subjective value increase. This contrasts
with proposals arguing that a general insensitivity to stimuli
(extended also to top outcomes) underlies AN (Davis &
Woodside, 2002; Kaye, Frank, Bailer, & Henry, 2005).
The empirical literature highlights two important aspects of
AN we have not discussed yet. The first aspect is harm avoid-
ance, reflecting a tendency to adopt avoidant strategies to cope
with potential threats (Cassin et al., 2005;Wagner et al., 2006;
Kaye et al., 2013). In general, it can be argued that perceiving
low control favours avoidance: if no action can manage a
potential threat, then avoidance appears as reasonable. The
RDMA proposes that, because of a high reference point, AN
is associated with low control in all life domains except body
shape, hence predicting adoption of avoidant strategies in
most life domains (in line with empirical evidence; Cassin
et al., 2005; Wagner et al., 2006; Kaye et al., 2013). A second
important aspect of AN not discussed yet is alexithymia, com-
bined with impaired interoception (Barca & Pezzulo, 2020;
Fassino, Pierò, Gramaglia, & Abbate-Daga, 2004; Kaye
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et al., 2013; Pollatos et al., 2008; Sexton, Sunday, Hurt, &
Halmi, 1998). It has been proposed that alexithymia and im-
paired interoception emerge because patients do not consider
body signals as valuable, hence setting goals that ignore these
signals (e.g., pursuing a low body weight even if this entails
painful hunger) (Barca & Pezzulo, 2020). With time,
disregarding these signals would impair the ability to read
them, resulting in alexithymia and impaired interoception
(Barca & Pezzulo, 2020). The RDMA does not examine
alexithymia and impaired interoception in AN; an interesting
avenue is thus to integrate the RDMAwith theories examining
these aspects.
Although our focus has been on contexts defined by the
external environment, our framework can view contexts as
arising from a combination of external and internal conditions
(Niv, Joel, & Dayan, 2006). For example, the same external
environment (e.g., school) can be associated with either being
hungry or being satiated, with eachmotivational state defining
a specific context and implying a specific outcome distribu-
tion with specific values (e.g., with food being valuable when
hungry but not when satiated). Exploring reference effects
within contexts defined by internal conditions appears as
promising, especially in disorders such as AN where an ex-
tremely rigid diet might impact upon parameters governing
internally defined contexts.
Research on evaluation highlights two distinct modes of
behaviour, goal-directed and habitual (although the debate
on how to describe them precisely is ongoing) (Balleine &
O'doherty, 2010). During goal-directed behaviour, an individ-
ual has a rich representation of the consequences of different
courses of actions, while habitual behaviour is driven by au-
tomatic stimulus-response associations. It has been suggested
that certain forms of mental illness initially emerge from goal-
directed processes, but as they chronicize, are then maintained
and exacerbated by habitual mechanisms (Everitt & Robbins,
2005; Gillan & Robbins, 2014). Such shift from goal-directed
to habitual behaviour has been proposed as critical in the
chronicization of AN (O’Hara, Campbell, & Schmidt, 2015).
This has implication for the RDMA, where goal-directed and
habitual mechanisms are not yet distinguished (more general-
ly, literature on reference effects remains to be integrated with
literature distinguishing goal-directed and habitual mecha-
nisms). A promising research avenue is to examine the dis-
tinction between goal-directed and habitual mechanisms with-
in the framework offered by the RDMA.
Recent models of AN propose a neuroscientific outlook to
understand this disorder. In particular, they highlight the role
of impairments in neural reward processes, involving neuro-
transmitters such as dopamine and serotonin (Kaye et al.,
2013; Keating, 2010; O’Hara et al., 2015). This literature em-
phasises the importance of integrating psychological and neu-
ral aspects to fully understand AN. By proposing a formal
description of key aspects of AN, the RDMA offers a potential
framework for this integration. For example, the RDMA
builds on notions such as reward, punishment, and control,
that can all be mapped to specific neural mechanisms. An
interesting research avenue is to explore the RDMA in the
context of neuroscientific literature on AN and to extend the
model to the neural level.
Conclusions
Building upon influential theories of AN, this paper proposes
a computational model of the illness, characterising the under-
lying processes in a formal way. In this way, the model
contributes to clarify the meaning of key concepts
adopted in the literature and of their relation. Such com-
putational account might help to foster theoretical de-
bate, formulating novel empirical predictions, and to in-
tegrate psychological and neuroscientific perspectives on
AN. Moreover, this proposal encourages the application
of reference-dependent evaluation models to other men-
tal disorders. For instance, depression might result from
an excessively high reference point characterising all
contexts with no exception (contrary to AN where body
shape would represent an exception), producing low
self-esteem and low control; whereas OCD might
emerge from a very similar profile to AN (in line with
the high comorbidity between the two conditions;
O'Brien & Vincent, 2003) but from cases where the
relative high control is not associated with body shape
but with other contexts, such as hygiene, security, or
order. Exploring the potential insight on mental illness
offered by reference-dependent evaluation models ap-
pears as a promising research avenue.
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